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VIRGINIA COMMENT
JURISDICTION UNDER "LONG-ARM" STATUTE OVER
BREACH OF WARRANTY ACTIONS
The 1964 General Assembly of Virginia enacted a "long-arm"
statute.' The term "long-arm" refers to the enlargement of a state's
jurisdictional powers over nonresident defendants. This adoption adds
Virginia to a growing list of states which have enacted similar legislation within the past decade.2 Several, in addition to Virginia, have
adopted the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act,3
providing six different bases upon which jurisdiction over nonresidents
"Va. Code Ann. § 8-81.2 (Supp. 1964). It reads as follows:
"When Personal Jurisdiction Over Person May Be Exercised
"(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly
or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's
"(i) Transacting any business in this State;
"(2) Contracting to supply services or things in this State;
"(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this State;
"(4) Causing tortious injury in this State by an act or omission outside
this State if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used
or consumed or services rendered, in this State;
"(5) Causing injury in this State to any person by breach of warranty expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this State when he
might reasonably have expected such person to use, consume, or be affected
by the goods in this State, provided that he also regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this State;
"(6) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this State;
or
"(7) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within
this State at the time of contracting.
"(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only
a cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted
against him; provided, however, nothing contained in this chapter shall limit,
restrict or otherwise affect the jurisdiction of any court of this State over foreign
corporations which are subject to service of process pursuant to the provisions of
any other Statute."
2Idaho Code Ann. § 5-514 (Supp. 1963); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 1no, § 17 (Smith.
Hurd 1956); Kansas Senate Bill No. 140, Sess. of 1963, § 6o-3o8 (Effective Jan. i.
1964); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 506.150 (3) (1959); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-27o2-2b
(Supp. 1963); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-16 (Supp. 1964); N.Y.CPLR § 302 (1963); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 55-145 (196o); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 187 (1963); Wash. Rev. Code §
4.28.185 (1962); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 262.05 (1963).
72, 75 (Pocket Part 1963).
sUniform Interstate and International Procedure Act § 1.o3, 9B U.L.A.
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may be predicated. 4 Virginia adds a seventh jurisdictional basis, which
is specifically designed to broaden and extend the scope of the state's
personal jurisdiction over nonresidents in breach of warranty actions.5
It is paragraph five and provides:
"(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action
arising from the person's

"(5) Causing injury in this State to any person by breach of
warranty expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this State when he might reasonably have expected such
person to use, consume, or be affected by the goods in this State,
provided that he also regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state;"
Background
The scope of in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
has been considerably expanded since the landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,( which was decided in 1945, and
developed further in the 1957 decision in McGee v. InternationalLife
7
Insurance Co.
"Only a few states have provided a separate jurisdictional basis for product
liability actions. See statutes of Kansas, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin,
supra note 2.
'Supra note 1. 2 University of Richmond Law Notes No. 2 (1964); Mr. J.
Westwood Smithers, author of the note, helped draft Virginia's "long-arm" statute.
Liability for an injury caused by negligent acts or omissions outside the forum
state has long been recognized. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 258-59 (1933); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. ioso (1916).
0326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7355 U.S. 220 (1957). After the decisions in the International Shoe and McGee cases, courts of several states significantly expanded the interpretation of
existing state jurisdictional statutes. Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 102
(4th Cir. 1962); Green v. Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co., 20o4 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.
Ind. 1962); Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md.
1950); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961); Nelson v. Miller, ii Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957); Adamek
v. Michigan Door Co., 260 Minn. 54, io8 N.V.2d 607 (1961); Shepard v. Rheem
Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 454, 1o6 S.E.2d 704 (1959); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement
Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 8o A.2d 664 (1951).
Although the Supreme Court has not passed directly on the constitutionality
of the "single-act" long-arm statutes, it is significant that the Supreme Court,
in deciding the McGee case, supra, cites Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Co.,
supra, and S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954), for the
proposition that the due process clause does not preclude the exercise of personal
jurisdiction provided there are "substantial connections with the state." Both these
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Until 1964 Virginia had elected not to follow the trend towards expanding in personam jursidiction. A statute requires that a foreign
corporation be "transacting business" in Virginia before extraterritorial jurisdiction can be asserted under the statute.8 The primary
purpose of that statute is to describe how to serve process on a foreign
corporation that is "transacting business" in this state. It qualifies as
a jurisdictional statute only to the extent that it requires foreign
corporations to be "transacting business" in Virginia before liability
will attach. 9 However, no reference is made as to when the corporation will be deemed "transacting business." Most of the Virginia cases
involving -the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations have arisen under Virginia statutes which refer only to how,
and not when, service of process shall be made. 10
Transacting business, or doing business," as interpreted by Virginia and federal courts applying Virginia law, means solicitation plus
some additional business activity,' 2 or doing sufficient business "as to
warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the
cases involved an isolated or single act transaction; nevertheless, the nonresident
defendants were held to have had sufficient contacts with the forum state.
In citing the Smyth and Howes cases the Supreme Court may have been placing its stamp of approval on this type of extended jurisdiction over nonresidents.
Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). Also the continued recognition of nonresident motorist statutes is persuasive authority that a
single tortious act committed within the state is sufficient to satisfy due process.
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); but see Nevins v. Revlon, Inc., 23 Conn.
Supp. 314, 182 A.2d 634 (Super. Ct. 1962).
If "one-act" statutes are to be held constitutional by the Supreme Court there is
no doubt that Virginia's paragraph five will be held constitutional because of its
more restrictive jurisdictional basis.
Wa. Code Ann. § 13.1-119 (Repl. Vol. 1964). Heretofore, Virginia's jurisdictional statutes provided only for in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Virginia's new "long-arm" statute provides for personal jurisdiction over
individuals as well as foreign corporations. This change is in conformity with the
earlier Supreme Court decision of Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S.
623 (1935).
9
Supra note 8, in pertinent part provides: "If a foreign corporation transacts
business in this State..., its directors, officers and agents doing such business
shall be jointly and severally liable for any contracts made or to be performed
in this State and any torts committed in this State ..."
Activities which do not constitute "transacting business" are enumerated
in the Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-1o2.1 (Repl. Vol. 1956).
1
OVa. Code Ann. § 8-6o (Repl. Vol. 1957); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-111 (Repl.
Vol. 1964); see also Va. Code Ann. § 8-81.3 (Cum.Supp. 1964).
"The term "transacting business" has been construed to mean "doing business"
within the forum state. Rock-ola Mfg. Corp. v. Wertz, 249 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 1957).
' 2Iliff v. American Fire Apparatus CO., 277 F.2d 360 (4 th Cir. 196o); Trignor v
L. G. Balfour 9. Co., 167 Va. 58, 187 S.E. 468 (1936).
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laws of the state."' 3 Courts in other states have chosen to follow the less
restrictive "substantial minimum contact" test.' 4
'Atlantic Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Metz, 70 F.2d 166 (4 th Cir. 1934); Carnegie
v. Art Metal Const. Co., 191 Va. 136, 6o S.E.2d 17 (1950); see 20 C.J.S. Corporation
1920 (1940).
1
Numerous factors are considered in determining what constitutes minimum
contacts within the state, Velandra v. Regie Nationale des Usines Renault, 336
F.2d 292, 298 (6th Cir. 1964); Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Bunge Corp., 307
F.2d 910, 914, 915 (4 th Cir. 1962); some of these factors are: volume of business
activity, Chovan v. E. 1. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 217 F. Supp. 8o8, 812, 813
(E.D. Mich. 1963); where an independent manufacturer's agent is told to solicit
orders and ship goods into the forum state, Wisconsin Metal & Chemical Corp. v.
DeZurik Corp., 222 F. Supp. 119, 123 (E.D. Wis. 1963); direct delivery in plaintiff's
state, Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., supra note 7; control exercised over local distributor, Sanders Associates, Inc. v. Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 915,
92o (ist Cir. 1962); representative's activity in forum state, Florio v. Powder Power
Tool Corp., 248 F.2d 367 (3rd Cir. 1957); direct shipment of goods to forum state
without agents in forum state, Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn.
571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (196o); an exclusive independent distributor in the state
through whom products are sold, Eclipse Fuel Eng'r Co. v. Superior Court, 148
Cal. App. 2d 736, 307 P.2d 739 (1957); inherently dangerous article shipped into the
forum state, Jeter v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co., 122 Cal. App. 2d 376, 265 P.2d
13o (Dist. Ct. App. 1954). See also, Hass v. Fancher Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp.
564, 567 (N.D. Il. 1957); Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963).
More than a counting of the number of contacts is necessary in exercising
jurisdiction. Factors such as interest of the forum state, forum non conveniens, and
the availability of the evidence are also considered. Waco-Porter Corp. v. Superior
Court, 211 Cal. App. 2d, 27 Cal Rptr. 371 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
Three rules for testing future litigation concerning the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents have been advocated. They provide as follows:
"(i) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some
transaction within the forum. It is not necessary that defendant's agent be
physically within the forum, for this act or transaction may be by mail only.
A single event will suffice if its effects within the state are substantial enough
to qualify under Rule Three.
"(2) The cause of action must be one which arises out of, or results from,
the activities of the defendant within the forum. It is conceivable that the
actual cause of action might come to fruition in another state, but because of
the activities of defendant in the forum state there would still be a 'substantial
minimum contact.'
"(3) Having established by Rules One and Two a minimum contact between
the defendant and the state, the assumption of jurisdiction based upon such
contact must be consonant with the due process tenets of 'fair play' and 'substantial justice.' If this test is fulfilled, there exists a 'substantial minimum
contact' between the forum and the defendant. The reasonableness of subjecting
the defendent to jurisdiction under this rule is frequently tested by standards
analogous to those of forum non conveniens." Note, 47 Geo. L.J. 342, 351-52
(1958).
These three rules are taken from a combined reading of the International
Shoe case, supra note 6; the McGee case, supra note 7; and Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958). These rules are discussed in the case of L. D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Industries, Inc., 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959).
Although the plaintiff's burden of showing minimum contacts is very light,
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Long-Arm Statute Problems
The insertion of paragraph five in Virginia's "long-arm" statute
raises the following problems:
(i) how Virginia's past approach to the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction will be affected;
(2) to what extent Virginia plaintiffs will be provided with a more
adequate remedy against acts or omissions occurring outside Virginia
with resulting consequences inside Virginia; and
(3)whether the "long-arm" statute will operate retrospectively.
The extent to which the Virginia statute expands in personam jurisdiction in breach of warranty actions depends on the interpretation
of the key words "regularly," "persistent," and "substantial" found in
paragraph five. Paragraph four of Virginia's "long-arm" statute requires the same business activity found under paragraph five. Therefore, it may be reasonably inferred that the Commissioner's notes relating to paragraph four apply equally to paragraph five. These notes
pertaining to paragraph four state: "It is not necessary that this activity amount to the doing of business."'15
There is little doubt as to the constitutionality of paragraph five.
The intentional use of the magical due process words, "regularly,"
"persistent," and "substantial," place paragraph five well within the
permissible scope of due process limits.16 The jurisdiotion of Virginia
courts is no longer limited by the doctrine that solicitation alone is
insufficient to constitute doing business in Virginia. 17 As long as the
the plaintiff must be prepared to prove jurisdiction if the nonresident defendant
challenges it. Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1964); see also,
Yack Mfg. Corp. v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 645, 21 Cal. Rptr. 51 (Dist. Ct. of
App. 1962); O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963).
15Supra note 3,at 77. The Commissioner's notes also indicate that the activity
required to satisfy the minimum contact test need have no relationship to the act
giving rise to the present cause of action. But where a "double substantial" relationship exists, then jurisdiction may be based on a single act. L. D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Industries, Inc., supra note 14.
Although the Commissioner's notes would not be binding upon a Virginia
court in its interpretation of paragraph five, they would provide the court with
persuasive secondary authority.
Past decisions concerning what constitutes "doing business" do not govern
the interpretation of the Illinois "long-arm" statute. Supra note 2. Haas v. Fancher
Furniture Co., supra note 14.
"The language of International Shoe, supra note 6, was probably adopted
by the drafters of Virginia's paragraph five in order to increase the possibility of
legislative approval, and to permit Virginia courts to interpret paragraph five as
broadly as necessary.
' TParagraph five requires only "that he regularly does or solicits business...."
The notion that solicitation alone is sufficient to constitute doing business by a
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nonresident defendant regularly solicits business and might reasonably
have expected "such person to use, consume, or be affected by the
goods in this State," jurisdiction most likely will be sustained.s
While Virginia's new statute appears to expand significantly personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, an examination of
paragraph five actually reveals a restrictive approach toward the extension of in personam jurisdiction when compared with "long-arm"
statutes of other states. 19 Virginia's "long-arm" statute is the only one
which expressly creates a jurisdictional basis exclusively for breach of
warranty actions. In other states jurisdiction for breach of warranty
actions is usually asserted under a "single-act" provision designed for
20
tortious injury actions.
In 1956 Illinois enacted the first "single-act" statute, which several
states have adopted. 2' "Single-act" statutes have a broader application
than do Virginia's paragraphs four and five. Under a "single-act"
statute the nonresident defendant is not required to have systematic
or continuous contacts with the forum state, and the plaintiff does
foreign manufacturer was first presented in Traveler's Health Ass'n v. Virginia,
339 U.S. 643 (1950); and in Westcott-Alexander, Inc. v. Dailey, 264 F.2d 853 (4th
Cir. 1959) the Fourth Circuit said, "The distinction between solicitation and other,
frequently far less important, activity... is far from controlling." 264 F.2d at 857.
1it is intended that personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants should
be predicated on a general course of business activity with reasonableness, fairness,
and substantial justice as touchstones. This approach is supported by Gordon
Armstrong Co. v. Superior Court, i6o Cal. App. 2d 211, 325 P.2d 21, 27 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1958) (concurring opinion); Conn. v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871,
875 (1959); Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 92 (Tent. Draft No. 3 1956).
It does not violate traditional notions of fair play to provide that nonresidents
shall be tried in the courts of the state whose interest is direct and immediate.
Gillioz v. Kincannon, 213 Ark. 1010, 214 S.W.2d 212 (1948) and Smyth v. Twin State
Improvement Corp., supra note 7.
"Supra note 2.
"'Several states possess "long-arm" statutes which provide for personal jurisdiction in case of "the commission of a tortious act within this state." This provision was taken from Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 11o, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann., ch. 112, § 21(I)(B) (Cum. Supp. 1963); N.Y. CPLR § 302(a)(2) (1963);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-145(4) (196o); or upon the commission of a tort "in whole
or in part" in the state. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 303.13(3) (Pocket part 1963); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 12, § 855 (1958)Without stating that a breach of warranty action sounds in tort, some hold that
jurisdiction is obtainable for a breach of warranty action under "single-act" tortious
injury jurisdictional basis. Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn.
1959); Johns v. Bray State Abrasive Products Co., supra note 7; Connecticut Tool
& Mfg. Co. v. Bowsteel Distribs., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 290, 19o A.2d 236 (1963);
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., supra note 7; Smyth v.
Twin State Improvement Corp., supra note 7.
nSupra note 2.
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not have to show that the defendant might reasonably have expected
the person to use, consume, or be affected by the defective product.
In Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.22 the
Illinois Supreme Court sustained the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over an Ohio valve manufacturer. The failure of a defective valve and
the resulting injury, the last events necessary to make the manufacturer liable for committing a tortious act, occurred in Illinois, the
forum state. The court rejected the argument that the term "tortious
act" was intended to limit jurisdiction to those situations in which the
act or omission of the defendant occurred within Illinois, as distinguished from consequences in Illinois caused by an act having its
23
origin in another state.
2
Several states have a general product liability basis of jurisdiction.
Such a basis authorizes recovery under any theory of law: tort, contract, or breach of warranty.
North Carolina's "long-arm" statute has the broadest general
product liability basis for asserting jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. 25 It provides in pertinent part:
"(a) Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in
this State, by a resident of this State or by a person having a
usual place of business in this State, whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted business in
this State and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of action arising as
follows:

"(s) Out of the production, manufacture, or distribution
of goods by such corporation with the reasonable expectation
that those goods are to be used or consumed in this State and
2Supra note 7. An Illinois plaintiff brought an action for breach of warranty
against an Ohio valve manufacturer for a defective valve. The Ohio manufacturer
had shipped the valve to a Pennsylvania corporation, who installed it in a water
heater. The heater was shipped to Illinois where the plaintiff purchased it. Thereafter, the heater exploded in plaintiff's home causing him serious injury.
23The Gray case, supra note 7, is in conflict with an earlier Federal decision
on this point. In Hellriegal v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill.
1957), the court held that the section did not apply merely because the defective
product caused damage in Illinois. Since all the defendant's acts, with respect to
the defective product, occurred outside Illinois the defendant had not committed
a tortious act in Illinois.
"Kansas, North Carolina, and Oklahoma, supra note 2.
mSupra note 2. Although the defendant must reasonably expect that the goods
will be used or consumed in North Carolina, there is no requirement that the
defendant must reasonably expect "such person" to be affected by the product. In
this respect the North Carolina general product liability provision is broader than
paragraph five of Virginia's "long-arm" statute.
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are so used or consumed, regardless of how or where the goods
were produced, manufactured, marketed, or sold or whether
or not through the medium of independent contractors or dealers."
In applying this statute the North Carolina Supreme Court has carefully weighed the quantity and quality of the contacts within the
state. 26 Oklahoma's recently enacted "long-arm" statute contains a
general product clause which provides that "the manufacture, or distribution of a product which is sold in the regular course of business
within this state," shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of
Oklahoma.2 7 No cases have been decided under Section 187 (B)( 5) of
the Oklahoma statutes. Kansas has the narrowest general product liability section in its "long-arm" statute. 28 It reads as follows:
"Causes injury to persons or property within this state arising
out of an act or omission outside of this state by the defendant,
provided in addition, that at the time of the injury either (1)
the defendant was engaged in solicitation or services activities
within this state or (2) products, materials or things procured,
serviced or manufactured by the defendant anywhere where
used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of
trade or use."
4nThe general product liability provision of North Carolina's statute was held
inapplicable when applied to a single sale of defective yarn consummated in New
York with the reasonable expectation that the yam would be used in North
Carolina. The sale of yarn F.O.B. from the New York plant, and the performance
of the contract in New York, were the extent of business activity. The court held
the minimum contacts were insufficient to sustain jurisdiction. Erlanger Mills, Inc.
v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956); see also Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N.C. 423, 96 S.E.2d 445 (957).
The same court has held that where an Illinois corporation sold an allegedly
defective tractor-mower to an independent Virginia distributor, who resold it to a
North Carolina city and injury thereafter resulted, there were insufficient contacts to
sustain jurisdiction over either the Illinois manufacturer or the Virginia distributor. Moss v. City of Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445 (ig6i).
But where the distributor was not disclosed the court held the foreign corporation was subject to suit on the theory that demonstration and promotion activities
were sufficient contacts. Babson v. Clairol, Inc., 256 N.C. 227, 123 S.E.2d 508 (1962).
Jurisdiction was sustained where a foreign corporation shipped defective
gas heaters into North Carolina with the reasonable expectation that the heaters
would be installed and used by North Carolina residents. The court distinguished
earlier cases on their facts and held the statute was applicable in this particular
fact situation. Shepherd v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 454, io6 S.E.2d 704 (1959).
"'Supra note 2. The Oklahoma statute does not have the requirement that
the manufacturer, or seller must have reasonably expected the person to use, con.ume, or be alfected by the product shipped into the state.
Perhaps the phrase "in the regular course of business" can be equated to
Virginia's requirement that there must be either regular business or solicitation.
persistent conduct, or substantial revenue.
!"Supra note 2.
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It should be noted that only one of these conditions must be satisfied,
since the disjunctive "or" is used rather than the conjunctive "and."
Although no cases have been brought under this subparagraph, there is
no reason to assume, in view of the statute's "single-act" basis, that
either of these conditions are dependent upon the "doing business"
test.
Under paragraph five of the Virginia statute the plaintiff must
show that the defendant might reasonably have expected the plaintiff to use, consume, or be affected by the defective product, whereas,
the general product liability provisions do not contain such a requirement. While Virginia's paragraph five requires continuous or
regular contacts with the forum state, other "long-arm" statutes
possessing general product liability subsections do not define what
constitutes sufficient minimum contacts. Because of the elimination of
this requirement, general product liability statutes as a basis for jurisdiction are broader than the Virginia breach of warranty clause.
Although the Kansas general product liability paragraph is somewhat broader than Virginia's corresponding paragraph, the courts
could reach the same result under the entire Virginia statute.29
Relationship Between Different JurisdictionalBases
The drafter of section i.o3 of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act recognized the possible need for using different jurisdictional bases to obtain extraterritorial jurisdiction. The
need for a broader jurisdictional basis would arise where there has
been an isolated sale within a state of a defective product manufactured in another state. The Commissioner's note states, "In some instances a jurisdictional basis may be found under more than one subdivision."30 Although paragraph five of Virginia's "long-arm" statute is
not included within section 1.03 of the Uniform Act, it would seem
that the Commissioner's notes regarding the finding of jurisdiction
3For example, suppose a Virginia resident enters into a contract for the construction and shipment of bleacher seats for a public auditorium. The bleachers are
subsequently shipped to the Virginia purchaser, and installed by the purchaser.
This particular manufacturer has never transacted any other business in Virginia,
nor has he solicited or advertised in the state. As a direct result of a defective
part, the bleachers collapse, causing serious injury to numerous Virginia spectators. Possibly jurisdiction could be asserted under Virgina's paragraph five, provided the contract price constituted "substantial revenue." If the court found
that the contract price did not constitute "substantial revenue," it could still find
a valid jurisdictional base under either paragraphs one or two.
10Supra note 3, at 75.
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under more than one paragraph would apply equally to Virginia's
paragraph five. Therefore, assuming the plaintiff in a breach of warranty action can show that the defendant's activities fall within the
proviso portion of paragraph five, and that the non-resident defendant
might "reasonably have expected such person to use, consume, or be
affected by the goods in this State

...
,"

there is no reason why the

plaintiff cannot allege jurisdiction under either paragraphs one, two,
four, or five.
For example, in the case of a single sale, jurisdiction under paragraphs four and five would not be sustained because of insufficient
contacts. If the single sale were directly consummated between the
foreign seller and Virginia plaintiff, jurisdiction might be sustainable
under either paragraphs one or two. 31 Because the transaction was
direct, the foreign seller could not argue that he was being subjected
to the state's jurisdiction for unforeseen liability. 32 Several cases have
arisen where a defective product manufactured by a foreign corporation was purchased and taken into another state where the injury to
the purchaser occurred. 33 If the defective product purchased in Virginia is taken to an adjoining state where injury results to the purchaser, jurisdiction under paragraph five is not possible, since the
injury must occur "in this State," 34 but either paragraphs one or two
would provide possible jurisdictional bases, if minimum contacts with
Virginia could be shown.
The fact that jursdiction in some instances may be sustained under
more than one jurisdictional basis raises the problem of whether or
not the plaintiff can obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
on one theory and base his claim for recovery on a different theory.
One possible answer is found in the Commissioner's notes re"As paragraph two is worded it apparently authorizes jurisdiction on a wholly
executory foreign contract and also in cases of defective products delivered in
Virginia which clearly might not involve a "transaction" within the state.
'O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., supra note 14, at 570.
nFor example, a defective geologist hammer was made in one state, shipped
into New York where it was purchased by the plaintiff who was subsequently
injured by the hammer in Connecticut. The court placed great emphasis on the
dangerous nature of the hammer in sustaining jurisdiction. The court distinguished
the Erlanger Mills case, supra note 26, on the basis that only a commercial contract was breached, while in this case a tort was committed. Singer v. Walker, 21
App. Div. 2d 285, 25o N.Y.2d. 216 (Sup. Ct. 1964); see also Florio v. Powder Power
Tool Corp., supra note 14; but see Lolli v. Mack Truck, Inc., 17o F. Supp. 671 (E.D.
Pa. 1958), where a defective truck spring was manufactured in Illinois, sold to a
Pennsylvania plaintiff who was injured in New Jersey as a result of the defect. The
court held service of process was invalid as the injury did not occur in Pennsylvania.
See also, Easterling v. Cooper Motors, Inc., 26 F.R.D. i (M.D.N.C. 196o).
mSupra note i.
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garding section 1.o3 of the Uniform Act which states, "Each of the
subdivisions will support a cause of action under any theory of law." 35
For example, a cause of action arising from a "tortious injury" may
sound in contract, tort, or breach of warranty.
On the other hand, the legislature may have intended the jurisdictional fact in product liability actions against foreign manufacturers to be the act or omission committed outside the state and not
the resulting injury inside the state. While restricting the paragraphs
pertaining to breach of warranty and tortious acts occurring outside
the state with the regular and persistent conduct requirement, the
legislature did not similarly restrict the paragraph involving tortious
acts committed inside the state. Therefore, to obtain a recovery based
on either a tort or breach of warranty theory, 36 the plaintiff must
exercise jurisdiction only under those paragraphs designed for acts
occurring outside the forum state.
Relation To UCC
Creating an expanded jurisdictional basis specifically for breach
of warranty actions was thought desirable to complement and effectu3Supra note 3. Subsection (b) of Virginia's "long-arm" statute states in part
that, "when jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only
a cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted ....
against him..." This might be interpreted to mean, for example, that, if jurisdiction is obtained under paragraph two, a tort or breach of warranty cause of
action could be asserted against the defendant, because these are "acts enumerated
in this section." This might be a practical argument if the contract damages
would be less than damages under a tort or breach of warranty recovery theory.
3The Virginia Uniform Commercial Code provides two causes of action for
product liability cases: negligence and breach of warranty. Whether or not an
action brought for breach of warranty is an ex-delicto or ex-contractu action is a
a matter of much confusion and disagreement.
Some courts use a tort criteria to decide whether or not the plaintiff can sue
in contract, and then use a contract criteria on which to base the measure of
recovery. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (196o).
See S8 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 124 (1g6i). See also Prosser, Torts § 88, p. 546 (2d ed.
1955) for comments on whether breach of warranty sounds in tort or contract.
New York characterizes an alleged breach of warranty action as sounding in
tort for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. Singer
v. Walker, supra note 33; Goldberg v. Kollsman Inst. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., ii N.Y.2d
363 (1962).
Providing two causes of action simplifies the problem of characterizing breach
of warranty actions. The drafters of Virginia's Uniform Commercial Code may
have desired to avoid the confusion regarding whether or not breach of warranty
sounds in tort or contract by allowing a recovery based on either negligence or on
breach of warranty. Since Virginia's new statute provides a separate jurisdictional
basis for breach of warranty, tortious injury, and contract, the legislature most
likely intended to avoid completely such characterization problems.
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ate the breach of warranty section of Virginia's recently enacted Uniform Commercial Code, 37 thereby affording additional protection
to Virginia residents against defective goods or services originating
outside the state.
Under common law a recovery for an injury resulting from a
breach of warranty was obtainable only by showing privity between
the manufacturer and plaintiff.38 Because of this necessity Virginia
plaintiffs were often denied any effective remedy against the manufacturer. The initial inroads in Virginia against privity as a defense
to breach of warranty actions was made by case law,3 9 and then by
statute.40 Virginia's Uniform Commercial Code incorporates the
language found in the statute, stating that "lack of privity between
plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any action brought
against the manufacturer or seller of goods to recover damages for
breach of warranty, express or implied, or for negligence...-41

Although abolishing privity as a defense improves the plaintiff's
chances for a recovery, he still lacks any recourse against a foreign
manufacturer without some means of asserting in personam jurisdiction over him. Under Virginia's "transacting business" statutes a foreign manufacturer selling goods to a foreign retailer, who in turn
ships the goods into Virginia, would not be doing business in Virginia.42 By applying Virginia's "long-arm" statute to the same sit'Va. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318 (effective date Jan. I 1966), Chapter
gi9, Acts of General Assembly, Regular Session 1964.
'Actions brought for defects in food products: Blythe v. Camp Mfg. Co., 183
Va. 432, 32 S.E.2d 659 (1945); Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co., 166 Va. 314, 186
S.E. 94 (1936). Breach of warranty actions brought for defects in nonfood cases:
Harris v. Hampton Roads Tractor & Equip. Co., 202 Va. 958, 121 S.E.2d 471
(ig6i); H. M. Gleason & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 197 Va. 255, 88 S.E.2d
904 (1955); for a collection of cases see 77 C.J.S. Sales § 3o5 (1952).
r Privity was first abolished in sealed food cases. Swift & Co. v. Wells, 201 Va.
213, 11o S.E.2d 203 (1959).

' 0Privity was eliminated entirely as a defense in both food and nonfood cases.
Va. Code Ann. § 8-654.3 (Cum. Supp. 1964).
' 1Supra note 37.
Section 2-318 reads as follows:
"Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in
any action brought against the manufacturer or seller of goods to recover
damages for breach of warranty, express or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not purchase the goods from the defendant, if the
plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer or seller might reasonably have
expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods; however, this section
shall not be construed to affect any litigation pending on June twenty-nine,
nineteen hundred sixty two."
'"Iliff v. American Fire Apparatus Co., supra note 12. 23 Am. Jur. Foreign
Corporations § 371 (1939).
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uation, it is fairly certain that the foreign manufacturer would be
subject to the state's jurisdiction. Thus, without the expanded jurisdictional power provided by the "long-arm" statute, Virginia's Uniform Commercial Code would be less effective in protecting Virginia
plaintiffs against harm caused by defective goods.
While the "long-arm" statute puts teeth into section 2-318 of Virginia's Uniform Commercial Code, the Commercial Code operates
indirectly to provide a supplemental means for recovering when jurisdiction is not obtainable under paragraph five. Although Virginia
does not permit third-party practice, Virginia's Commercial Code establishes a close substitute commonly known as "vouching-in."4 3 Section 2-607 provides:
"Effect of Acceptance; Notice of Breach; Burden of Establishing Breach After Acceptance; Notice of Claim or Litigation
to Person Answerable Over.
"(5) Where the buyer is sued for breach of warranty or other
obligation for which his seller is answerable over
"(a) he may give his seller written notice of the litigation.
If the notice states that the seller may come in and defend
and that if the seller does not do so he will be bound in any
action against him by his buyer by any determination of fact
common to the two litigations, then unless the seller after
seasonable receipt
of the notice does come in and defend he
'44
is so bound.
The need for "vouching-in" only arises when the foreign manufacturer is beyond the jurisdictional reach of the plaintiff.45 Where a foreign
manufacturer only engages in sporadic business activity through an
independent retailer, the plaintiff's direct remedy is against the retailer for breach of warranty. If the retailer chooses to invoke the
"vouching-in" section of Virginia's Uniform Commercial Code, he can
force the foreign manufacturer to submit to jurisdiction and defend or
43A good example of how third party practice may work to plaintiff's advantage
is shown in the case of Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951).
4'Supra note 37, at § 2-607. This section may have the effect of changing
Virginia law prohibiting third party practice.
The theory underlying "vouching-in" is that the manufacturer not only warrants the quality of the goods sold, but also warrants he will defend or be bound
by the judgment against the buyer-retailer. Because vouching letters cross state
lines, conflict of law questions will arise; but since the promise to defend is implicit in the warranty given by the manufacturer, full faith and credit controversies are likely to be resolved in the buyer-retailer's favor. 51 Calif. L. Rev. 471
(1963). See Lowrance Buick Co. v. Mullina, 91 Ga. App. 865, 87 S.E.2d 412 (Ct.
App. 1955), where Georgia gives effect to a Tennessee judgment.
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be bound by an adverse judgment against the retailer.4 6 There are
strong pressures against the foreign manufacturer to submit to jurisdiction because he will ultimately be liable to the retailer on the
theory of indemnification and will desire to control the litigation, if
liability is likely to be imposed upon him.
Retroactivity
The first problem the Virginia courts will likely be called upon
to decide is whether paragraph five operates retroactively in cases
where the cause of action had arisen before Virginia's "long-arm"
statute became effective. There is nothing within Virginia's constitution which expressly prohibits a statute from operating retrospectively.47 In the McGee case48 the applicable California jurisdiction statute
became effective one year after the defendant insurance company had
assumed the insurance contract, and the Supreme Court applied the
California statute retrospectively without difficulty.
In Nelson v. Miller,49 the court decided that the Illinois "long-arm"
statute operated retroactively. The statute established a means of
securing existing rights, and did not destroy any vested rights. A recent
Federal case from Michigan is to the same effect.5 0
Contrary to the Michigan case, a lower Connecticut court in Nevins
v. Revlon, Inc.,51 held that, since Connecticut's "long-arm" statute
affected "fundamental" substantive rights, the statute operated only
prospectively.
The essence of the problem of retroactivity is whether or not the
operation of Virginia's "long-arm" statute affects vested rights, 52 as
Virginia courts have held that a statute not involving vested rights may
operate retrospectively. 53 Although there are no Virginia cases deciding
'omment,
B.C.U.C.C. Co-Ord. §§ 2-312 (1963); See Frank v. McCafferty
Ford Co., 192 Pa. Super. 435, 161 A.2d 896 (1960).
'Wa. Const. Art. 4, § 58 (19o2); Whitlock v. Hawkins, 105 Va. 242, 53 S.E. 401
(i9o6).
"8Supra note 7.
d11 III. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
wChovan v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 217 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Mich.
1963); see generally 5o Am. Jur. Statutes, § 478 (1944); 2 Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, § 2212 (3rd ed. 1943).
12 3 Conn. Supp. 314, 182 A.2d 634 (Super. 1962); Gillioz v. Kincannon, supra
note x8.
rWirginia defines a vested right "as a right, so fixed, that it is not dependent on any future act, contingency, or decision to make it more secure." Bain v.
Boykin, 18o Va. 259, 23 S.E.2d 127 (1942).
13Ferguson v. Ferguson, i69 Va. 77, 192 S.E. 774, (1937).
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whether jurisdictional statutes affect vested rights,54 it seems evident
that Virginia's "long-arm" statute is intended to be procedural in
character and to be concerned primarily with granting the power to
Virginia's courts to "adjudicate ripened disputes." 5 As a general rule,
a party has no vested rights in matters of procedure. 56
The nonresident defendant might argue that if the jurisdiction
over him is based on his regular solicitation, this would constitute a
new right or remedy for the plaintiff that had not existed prior to the
enactment of paragraph five. The more logical argument would be
that the statute does not create a new right or cause of action, but
merely carries into force the cause of action created by substantive
law. 57 The statute provides the legal machinery by which a substan-

tive right for redress is made effective.
Conclusion
As cases come before the Virginia courts under paragraph five,
there will be two basic problems to face. 58 The first is whether or not
"'The question of whether or not Virginia's nonresident motorist statute applies retrospectively has never arisen. Va. Code Ann. § 8-67.1 (Repl. Vol. 1957).
Other states have held their nonresident motorist statutes not to operate retrospectively. Monacelli v. Grimes, 48 Del. 122, 99 A.2d 255 (1953); Ogden v. Gianakos,
415 Ill. 591, 114 N.E.2d 686 (1953); Davis v. Jones, 247 Iowa 1031, 78 N.W.2d 6
(1954); State ex rel. Clay Equip. Corp. v. Jensen, 363 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1963); Cassan
v. Fern, 33 N.J. Super. 96, io9 A.2d 482 (1954); Teller v. Edwards, 56 Wash. 2d
652, 354 P.2d 925 (1960).
Nonresident motorist statutes have been distinguished from personal jurisdiction statutes on the basis that nonresident motorist statutes are based on a
"fictional agency relationship" while in jurisdictional statutes the relationship
is between a tortfeasor and the victim. This relationship exists prior to, and independent of, the jurisdictional statute. Chovan v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours 8=Co.,
supra note 5o.
5Flaherty v. United Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 661, 663 (E.D.
Pa. 1961); Connell v. Kanwa Oil, Inc., 161 Kan. 649, 657, 170 P.2d 631, 636 (1946).
r4Link v. Receivers of Seaboard Air Line Ry. 73 F.2d 149, 151 (4 th Cir. 1934).
82 C.J.S. Statutes, § 416 (1953).
01f the cause of action arose before privity was completely abolished as a
defense by statute, the plaintiff would have no existing rights because the statute is
not intended to affect suits pending at its effective date; Va. Code Ann. § 8-654.3
(Cum. Supp. 1964).
5'The problem of whether or not jurisdiction over a nonresident can be sustained is a combined state and Federal matter. Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, Inc.,
165 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948); Hilton v. W. T. Grant Co., 212 F. Supp. 126 (W.D.
Pa. 1962); Mirabella v. Banco Industrial de la Republica Argentina, 38 Misc. 2d 128,
237 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
A third problem to be considered is which state's substantive law may indirectly bear upon whether or not to sustain the assertion of personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant. The fact that a state's substantive law is applicable
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paragraph five is applicable to a particular nonresident defendant in a
given fact situation. It is impossible to draft any statute that encompasses every conceivable fact situation. For example: a plaintiff is injured
by a defective product manufactured by an independent subsidiary
corporation doing business in Virginia. Prior to bringing suit, the subsidiary is declared bankrupt. Can the plaintiff now obtain jurisdiction
over the foreign parent corporation which has absolutely no contacts
with Virginia? Secondly, if the statute is applicable will the exercise of
in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident deprive the defendant of
his property without due process of law, hinder or burden interstate
commerce, or violate the equal protection of the laws?
The answers to these questions must come on a case-by-case basis
as there is no magic formula for predicting under what fact situation
Virginia courts will sustain or deny the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction under paragraph five.
Although paragraph five of Virginia's "long-arm" statute is conservatively phrased, a reasonable interpretation of this paragraph will
allow the Virginia courts to change significantly Virginia law relating
to in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. Virginia
plaintiffs have been provided with a more effective remedy against
foreign sellers or manufacturers of defective goods shipped into Virginia.
PHILIP H.

SHAFER

may constitute the jurisdictional fact upon which to base the exercise of personal
jurisdiction. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., supra note
7; 19 Wash. & Lee Rev. 271, 276 (1962). The substantive law of the place of sale
controls in breach of warranty action, while the substantive law of the place of
injury controls in negligence cases. 76 A.L.R.2d 15O (g6i).
The applicability of a state's substantive law is one of the integral factors to
be considered by states which follow the "center of gravity" approach in determining whether or not to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents in a breach
of warranty action. Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 196o), which
is the first case to apply the "center of gravity" theory in a breach of warranty
action.

